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Chapter 1
Introduction
Individuals typically cannot foresee all consequences of their actions. This is due to the
fact that the consequences of one’s actions depend on numerous variables and a decision-
maker has only limited control over them. Among other things, social components (e.g.,
the behavior of others) or natural components (e.g., the weather) shape the outcome
of an individual choice and are therefore important determinants which are outside the
individual’s reach (Platt and Huettel, 2008). This implies that most human decisions are
made under a state which behavioral scientists refer to as uncertainty (Knight, 1921).
Basically all decisions in our lives are made under this state. This not only holds for
decisions on the individual level, such as crossing a street (a car might hit you), but
also for decisions on the global level, such as mitigating climate change or dealing with
financial crises. The latter group of examples is characterized by a large impact on
economic growth and welfare. A thorough understanding of individual and collective
behavior under uncertainties is necessary to sufficiently address these challenges and
consequently has been a major concern of (behavioral) economists (Gu¨th et al., 1982;
Ostrom et al., 1992; Simon, 1959).
As indicated above, evaluating the probabilities of uncertain events is fundamental for
human decision-making. In order to assess the likelihood of uncertain outcomes, people
often apply rules of thumb, so-called judgmental heuristics. On the one hand, heuristics
might be advantageous by shortening the decision process or by shifting attention to
important aspects of a choice problem. On the other hand, they can lead to discrepancies
between an individual’s assessment of a situation and objective measures (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974). For example, when people estimate the likelihood of an event, they are
typically influenced by current news reports. Media coverage, however, is usually high for
rare events, but low for common events, and therefore not representative of the probability
of an event. Consequently, people tend to overestimate the probability of rare events,
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such as airplane accidents, and underestimate the probability of common events, such as
car accidents. This mental short-cut is known as the availability heuristic (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1973). Studying judgmental heuristics is an important field of research for
at least two distinct reasons. First, they suggest insights into the psychology underlying
human judgment and thereby improve our understanding of individual decision-making
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). These insights might provide more realistic foundations
for models of human behavior (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Second, they can explain
aggregate market results, e.g., overconfidence potentially explains excessive trading in
stock markets (Barber and Odean, 2001). While traditionally it has been proposed
that cognitive processes are the main driver for behavior, growing evidence stresses the
importance of biological underpinnings (Angie et al., 2011; Lerner et al., 2015; Ochsner
and Phelps, 2007; Phelps et al., 2014).
Damasio (1994), for example, argues that emotional body signals play an important role
in decision-making. According to his theory, changes in the somatic state of an individual
do not only accompany human behavior, but they have direct influence. This is supported
by empirical evidence from studies using the Iowa Gambling Task. In the Iowa Gambling
Task, patients with damage to the ventromedial sector of prefrontal cortices and healthy
control participants choose repeatedly cards from four available decks. While two decks
are advantageous because they have a positive expected value, the other two decks are
disadvantageous in the sense that they have a negative expected value. In the course
of the experiment, healthy participants learn to choose cards from the advantageous
decks. At the same time they produce anticipatory skin conductance responses (SCRs)
preceding disadvantageous decisions even before they are able to verbally express the rule
underlying this task. In contrast to that, patients do not follow an optimal strategy and
also lack the aforementioned body reactions. Some of them, however, are able to verbally
identify the advantageous decks at the end of the experiment. Based on this finding,
Damasio and colleagues conclude that overt reasoning might not be enough to make
advantageous decisions and that emotional body reactions appear necessary (Bechara
et al., 1996, 1997, 2000, 2005; Damasio, 1994). Besides emotions, many other biological
factors have an impact on behavior, such as hormones (Bro¨der and Hohmann, 2003;
Brunnlieb et al., 2016; Chavanne and Gallup, 1998; Cueva et al., 2015; Margittai et al.,
2016) or genes (Kreek et al., 2005; Kuhnen and Chiao, 2009; Stoel et al., 2006).1 Taken
together with the work by Damasio and colleagues, these findings stress the importance
of biological factors on decision-making.2
1While there is evidence for a causal relation between hormones and decision-making, studies on genes
and decision-making currently provide only evidence for a correlation.
2This, however, does not mean that other aspects have no influence on behavior. It is well known
that cultural and social influences are important. For an overview, please refer to the Dual Inheritance
Theory (Durham, 1991).
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The motivation of this thesis is to study the connection between the two aforementioned
strands of research. In particular, it focuses on well-known heuristics of individual
decision-making and tries to find biological factors that accompany them. For this
purpose, research methods from different scientific fields – including behavioral economics,
psychology, neuroscience, biology, and anthropology – are applied. This interdisciplinary
approach is supposed to provide holistic insights into processes underlying individual
behavior. Thereby, this thesis contributes to the field of behavioral and neuroeconomics.
The following four well-known characteristics of individual decision-making are addressed
within this thesis:
Loss aversion
Loss aversion refers to a tendency that people give more weight to losses than to gains of
equal size (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Numerous studies have provided an empirical
basis for loss aversion on the behavioral level (Ganzach and Karsahi, 1995; Kahneman
et al., 1990), the psychophysiological level (Hochman and Yechiam, 2011; Sokol-Hessner
et al., 2009), the brain level (De Martino et al., 2010; Tom et al., 2007) and in self-reported
feelings (McGraw et al., 2010). Based on the accumulated evidence, loss aversion has
been used as an explanation for a variety of other empirical findings both from the
laboratory and the field, among others are the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980) and the
status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). Furthermore, it is an integral part of
prospect theory, the dominating theory of decision-making under risk (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979).
Framing
Framing describes a judgmental heuristic where individuals react systematically different
to the same choice problem depending on how it is presented. For example, Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) explore how framing affects participants’ decisions in a hypothetical life
and death situation. In their choice problem, participants choose between two treatments
for 600 potential victims of a deadly disease. It is predicted that treatment A would
lead to 400 deaths, whereas treatment B has a 33% chance that no one would die, but
a 66% chance that everyone would die. This hypothetical choice is presented either in
a positive frame emphasizing how many people would survive or in a negative frame
emphasizing how many people would die. In a positive frame, 72% of the participants
choose treatment A. In a negative frame, by contrast, only 22% of the participants opt
for treatment A. In this example, participants are risk seeking in the loss domain but
risk averse in the gain domain. This finding violates rational economic theory, which
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assumes that changes in frames do not alter behavior in a systematic way. Framing
effects are robust findings that are reported in different settings (Ga¨chter et al., 2009;
Johnson et al., 1993).
Overconfidence
Social comparison theory suggests that individuals make predictions in both social and
individual contexts every day. For example, the decision to participate in a competition
is driven by predictions about one’s own abilities relative to the competitors’ (Festinger,
1954; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). While under certain circumstances it appears
beneficial to base such a decision on accurate judgments, in some situations it may
be advantageous to be overconfident (Mannes and Moore, 2013). Among other things,
overconfidence can have a positive impact on one’s own motivation and a detrimental
impact on competitors’ motivation (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2002; McKay and Dennett,
2009; Wrangham, 1999). If this is the case, overconfidence increases the probability of
success and therefore could be seen as an adaptive survival strategy (McKay and Dennett,
2009). Empirically, overconfidence has a positive impact on success in academia (Stankov
et al., 2012) and war (Johnson and Fowler, 2011). Additionally, it seems to promote
human well-being by giving oneself a positive view of the future (Taylor and Brown,
1988, 1994). It does not, however, increase the chances of success in every situation,
because overconfident beliefs are by definition inaccurate (Plous, 1993). Therefore, they
can be exploited by rational agents (Della Vigna and Malmendier, 2006). For instance,
overconfident investors trade too much and thereby reduce their earnings (Barber and
Odean, 2001). Overly optimistic beliefs about the future potentially explain the high
rates of business failure (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). These findings suggest that the
adaptiveness of overconfidence is highly sensitive to the strategic context in which it is
deployed.
Ambiguity aversion
Ambiguity aversion describes the tendency that individuals prefer known probability
distributions over unknown probability distributions. This behavior was first reported
upon by Ellsberg (1961). Since then, it has become an important explanation for a
variety of observed phenomena, among others the equity premium puzzle (Collard et al.,
2011; Rieger and Wang, 2012) and the stock market participation puzzle (Dow and
Werlang, 1992; Easley and O’Hara, 2009). One possible explanation for the bias towards
ambiguity is that individuals prefer options about which they are best informed (Frisch
and Baron, 1988).
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In order to study the neurobiological foundations of the above described judgmental
heuristics, the following research methods are applied:
Laboratory experiments
Laboratory experiments are an integral part of the behavioral and neuroeconomic toolbox.
During an experiment, participants typically make a sequence of decisions in a controlled
environment. This approach is supposed to reveal their preferences (Camerer and
Loewenstein, 2004; Camerer et al., 2005). Besides behavior, brain activity or physiological
responses can be recorded during the experimental procedure and subsequently integrated
into the analysis. All experiments within this thesis are incentivized,3 but they apply
different types of incentives. While the studies in Chapter ??, ??, ??, ?? and ?? use
monetary payments as incentives, the studies in Chapter ?? and ?? are incentivized by
means of unpleasant, but not painful, electric shocks. Due to ethical concerns, participants
rarely put their own money at stake in an experiment, which makes it difficult to study
decision-making in the loss domain. Therefore, unpleasant electric shocks are a commonly
used tool in neuroeconomics to simulate real losses in a laboratory environment (Berns
et al., 2008).4
Electrodermal activity
Electrodermal activity is a commonly used psychophysiological indicator for emotional
arousal (Boucsein, 1992). It has been shown to be sensitive to monetary outcomes and
cognitive biases (Bechara et al., 2005; Boucsein, 1992; Ring, 2015). Furthermore, it
seems to have substantial impact on individual decision-making (Damasio, 1994). Within
this thesis, electrodermal acitivity is analyzed by means of continuous decomposition
analysis (Benedek and Kaernbach, 2010). This approaches separates SCRs into a phasic
(stimulus-driven) and a tonic (stimulus-independent) part by taking the characteristics
of the underlying sudomotor nerve activity into account. The analysis of electrodermal
activity within this thesis focuses on its phasic components.
3In contrast to psychological experiments, behavioral and neuroeconmic experiments are typically
incentivized. The main argument for using incentives is that it makes laboratory experiments more
comparable to real-world behavior (Ariely and Norton, 2007).
4The research design was approved by the Ethics Committee of the German Psychological Society and
performed in agreement with the Declaration of Helsinki. The ethic statements are within the papers.
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Digit ratio
The ratio between the lengths of the second and the fourth digits of hands (2D:4D digit
ratio) has been proposed as bio-marker of prenatal testosterone exposure. Prenatal
testosterone exposure is thought to affect the brain development and thereby subsequent
behavior (Manning et al., 1998; Manning, 2002). The relationship between digit ratio and
prenatal testosterone is negative, i.e., a low digit ratio indicates a high level of prenatal
testosterone exposure and vice versa (Lutchmaya et al., 2004). Among other things, digit
ratios are negatively correlated with physical fitness (Ho¨nekopp et al., 2006) and facial
attractiveness (Ferdenzi et al., 2011). For the measurement of the digit ratio, both hands
are scanned with a high resolution scanner. Then, the length of the second and fourth
digits are measured from the basal crease to the finger tip in a photo editor. Usually this
task is performed by two independent raters and the mean of both rates are used for
the subsequent analysis (Neyse and Bran˜as-Garza, 2014). This approach is supposed to
reduce individual measurement errors.
Evolutionary theory
From a biological point of view, the human species is the result of an ongoing evolutionary
process (Darwin and Wallace, 1858; Evans et al., 2005). Taking the evolutionary process
and the resulting requirements into account can help to explain observed behavior and
judgmental heuristics (Buss, 1989). One example is the idea that men and women
had different biological requirements during the evolutionary past and that this might
contribute to observed gender differences in behavior (Trivers, 1972). Schmidt et al. (2015)
show theoretically and empirically that this framework can explain gender differences in
risk taking behavior.
Special participant group: Problem gamblers
Research involving special participant groups – e.g., patients with psychiatric or neuro-
logical disorders – can provide insights into the decision-making processes of the general
population (Damasio, 1994). For example, if patients with an identified brain lesion in
region X show impaired decision-making abilities on a specific task, this might indicate
that region X is used to do this task (Camerer et al., 2004). This thesis involves a
study on problem gamblers’ risk taking behavior. In general, gambling is a challenge for
classical theories of decision-making under risk, because the odds are typically against
the gambler. Still many people gamble and some continue with gambling although
it has sever negative consequences for them, such as debt overload (Pietrzak et al.,
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2005), involvement in criminal activities (Yeoman and Griffiths, 1996) or social isolation
(Trevorrow and Moore, 1998). From this perspective, (problem) gambling can serve as a
test case for new theories of decision-making under risk (Camerer et al., 2004).
Having outlined the research field and the applied methods, the next paragraphs give
an overview of the content of the seven papers of this thesis and describe how they are
related to each other.
The first paper studies SCRs during the anticipation of monetary gains and losses in a
roulette task. Under the loss aversion hypothesis one might expect that the anticipation
of a loss would lead to a higher level of emotional arousal than the anticipation of a gain of
equal size. Contrary to this prediction, we found that SCRs during the anticipation phase
were not significantly different between gains and losses of equal size. SCRs, however, were
sensitive towards the magnitude of the bet size. This currently unpublished manuscript
is a joint work with Ulrich Schmidt.
The second paper aims at a better understanding of how probabilities are perceived by
individuals in terms of emotional body reactions. In order to analyze emotional body
reactions preceding negative events with varying probability of occurrence, we have our
participants play a two-stage card game. The first stage of the card game reveals the
probability of receiving an unpleasant electric shock. The second stage applies the electric
shock with the previously announced probability. SCRs increase monotonically with the
probability of receiving an electric shock during the anticipation phase. This paper is
a joint work with Christian Kaernbach and it is published as: Ring, P. and Kaernbach,
C. (2015). Sensitivity towards fear of electric shock in passive threat situations. PLOS
ONE, 10(3):e0120989. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120989.
Based on this finding, the third paper studies the framing effect and its emotional
underpinnings. In this study, participants are exposed to different probabilities of
receiving an unpleasant electric shock. Information about electric shock probabilities
is either positively or negatively framed. I find evidence for a relationship between
emotional body reactions and the framing effect. Under negative frames, participants
show significantly higher SCRs while waiting for an electric shock to be delivered than
under positive frames. This finding is important for behavioral and neuroeconomics,
because it shows that framing effects occur in well-educated and well-informed individuals
on a low emotional level. This is a single-author paper and it is published as: Ring,
P. (2015). The framing effect and skin conductance responses. Frontiers in Behavioral
Neuroscience, 9:188. doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00188.
The fourth paper studies a potential relationship between digit ratio and risk taking. This
study is motivated by empirical findings indicating gender differences in risk preferences.
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Typically, it is reported that women are more risk and loss averse than men. This
potentially indicates an underlying biological mechanism. One potential mechanism is
prenatal testosterone, which is thought to have an impact on the brain development
and thereby on subsequent sex-typical behavior. Our findings reveal that men with
lower digit ratios (i.e., a higher level of prenatal testosterone) show lower degrees of loss
aversion. This offers a potential explanation for the observed gender differences in risk
taking. This currently unpublished manuscript is a joint work with Levent Neyse, Ulrich
Schmidt, Ferdinand M. Vieider, Catharina C. Probst, Christian Kaernbach and Thilo
van Eimeren.
The fifth paper contributes to a better understanding of the biological underpinnings of
overconfidence by analyzing performance predictions in the Cognitive Reflection Test
with and without monetary incentives. The main finding of this study is that men
with low digit ratios are more sensitive towards different incentive structures. In the
un-incentivized treatment, we find that males with low digit ratios, on average, are
significantly more overconfident about their performance. In the incentivized treatment,
however, we observe that males with low digit ratios, on average, are less overconfident
about their performance. These effects are not observed in females. This paper is a
joint work with Levent Neyse, Steven Bosworth and Ulrich Schmidt and it is published
as: Neyse, L., Bosworth, S., Ring, P., and Schmidt, U. (2016). Overconfidence, incentives
and digit ratio. Scientific Reports, 6:23294. doi:10.1038/srep23294.
The sixth paper studies the impact of different outcome correlation structures on gender
differences in ambiguity aversion. From an evolutionary perspective, we expected that
men would be more sensitive to changes in outcome correlation structures than women.
In the evolutionary past, men had to be more concerned about relative outcomes, since
their reproductive success mainly depended on their relative standing within society;
women, by contrast, had to be more concerned about absolute outcomes, because their
reproductive success was mainly linked to their access to resources for themselves and
their children. This hypothesis was supported by the empirical evidence. This currently
unpublished manuscript is a joint work with Andreas Friedl and Ulrich Schmidt.
Finally, the seventh paper studies financial risk preferences of problem gamblers including
their risk attitudes in the gain and loss domain, their degree of loss aversion and their
perception of probabilities. To our knowledge, this is the first study which provides
a comprehensive analysis of their financial risk behavior. Our findings suggest that
problem gamblers are systematically more risk taking and less sensitive towards changes
in probabilities in the gain domain only. Neither their degree of loss aversion nor
their risk attitudes in the loss domain are significantly different from the controls.
These novel insights provide an explanation why some individuals persist in gambling
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activities – despite their severe negative consequences – while the general population
does not. Furthermore, we discuss potential medical applications of these findings. This
currently unpublished manuscript is a joint work with Christian Kaernbach, Levent
Neyse, Catharina C. Probst, Thilo van Eimeren, Stephan Wolff and Ulrich Schmidt.
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